This paper investigates the effect of CFO gender on corporate tax aggressiveness. Focusing on firms that experience a male-to-female CFO transition, the paper compares those firms' degree of tax aggressiveness during the pre-and posttransition periods. Using the probability of tax sheltering, the predicted unrecognized tax benefits, and the discretionary permanent book-tax differences to measure tax aggressiveness, we find that female CFOs are associated with less tax aggressiveness as compared to their male counterparts. The main findings are supported by additional tests based on propensity score matching, difference-in-differences tests, and tests with a female-to-male CFO transition sample. Overall, our study establishes CFO gender as an important determinant of tax aggressiveness.
INTRODUCTION
T his paper examines the impact of CFO gender on corporate tax aggressiveness. 1 Prior studies find that substantial variations in the level of firms' tax avoidance exist (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew 2008) . Researchers identify a wide range of firm characteristics and executive compensation incentives as determinants of tax avoidance. 2 Bill B. Francis is a Professor at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Iftekhar Hasan is a Professor at Fordham University and Scientific Advisor at Bank of Finland, Qiang Wu is an Assistant Professor at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, and Meng Yan is an Assistant Professor at Fordham University.
male-to-female CFO transition. The results are consistent with our conjecture that female CFOs are less tax aggressive than their male counterparts. The results are also economically meaningful. For example, we find that the probability of tax sheltering for firms under the control of female CFOs is about 17.4 percent lower than that for firms under the control of male CFOs.
Female CFOs, however, may not be randomly chosen when they are hired. In addition, unobservable time series changes contemporaneous with CFO changes could also affect tax aggressiveness. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we run three additional tests. First, we use a difference-in-differences research design, in which we use male-to-female CFO transitions as the treatment group and male-to-male CFO transitions as the control group. Second, we use a one-to-one propensity score matching approach to construct a matching sample (firms with male CFOs) and then compare the degree of tax aggressiveness between the treatment sample (firms with female CFOs) and the matching sample (firms with male CFOs). Third, we construct a sample of female-to-male CFO transitions and find that tax aggressiveness increases after firms change their CFOs from female to male. Results from all three tests are consistent with our hypothesis and triangulate our findings from the baseline regressions.
We argue that female CFOs' risk aversion is the underlying reason behind the gender effect on tax aggressiveness. If this is the case, then one should expect the identified relation between female CFOs and tax aggressiveness to vary with the different levels of risk that female CFOs face. To test this conjecture, we bisect the full sample into firms with high and low job security risk. We find that the impact of female CFOs on tax aggressiveness only exists when they face high job security risk. The result is consistent with risk aversion of female CFOs being a channel through which gender affects tax aggressiveness.
Recent studies suggest that overconfidence by male CFOs could also make females' choices seem conservative (e.g., Barber and Odean 2001; Huang and Kisgen 2013) . To examine whether our results are driven by risk aversion of female CFOs or overconfidence of male CFOs, we conduct two sets of tests. 4 First, we control for overconfidence and the interaction between overconfidence and gender effect. We find that male-to-female CFO transitions are associated with a reduced level of tax aggressiveness regardless of whether CFOs are overconfident. Second, if risk aversion of female CFOs makes firms miss valuable tax-saving opportunities, then good corporate governance should mitigate the documented gender effect. Indeed, we find some evidence that female CFOs' conservatism in tax strategy is diminished in firms with good corporate governance. Overall, the results suggest that risk aversion of female CFOs is likely an important reason behind the documented gender effect on tax aggressiveness.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first study to document the effect of executive gender on tax aggressiveness. Dyreng et al. (2010) find executive fixed effects on broad tax avoidance but fail to find a gender effect. In contrast, we focus on tax aggressiveness, which is more likely to be affected by the risk preferences of top executives and, hence, provides a stronger test setting. 5 Additionally, we use a methodology that allows us to better isolate the gender effect. Our study provides insight into the role that executives' risk preferences play in the development of a firm's tax strategy. It responds to Hanlon and Heitzman's (2010) call for more research on the impacts of individual top executives on corporate tax strategies.
Broadly, our paper is also part of an emerging literature on the gender effects in corporate decision making. For instance, Barua et al. (2010) find that firms with female CFOs have higher financial reporting quality. Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female executives are less likely to make acquisitions and issue debt, and when they make acquisitions the announcement returns are higher compared to those made by firms with male executives. In this paper, we link the risk aversion of female executives with firm tax aggressiveness and provide evidence that complements and extends the above line of research. Our evidence suggests that although female CFOs engage in broad tax avoidance similar to their male counterparts, they pursue aggressive tax strategies to a lesser extent, probably to avoid additional risk.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. We first briefly review the relevant research and present our hypothesis. Next, we describe our sample selection process and present descriptive statistics. Multivariate tests are conducted in the following section. The final section summarizes and concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT Tax Aggressiveness and Risk
Taxes represent a significant cost to a company. Tax savings typically increase after-tax earnings, cash flows, and shareholder wealth. For example, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find a positive relation between tax avoidance and firm value for well-governed firms. It is not surprising that firms actively engage in activities that aim to reduce taxes. Rego and Wilson (2012) provide empirical evidence that firms give managers compensation incentives to engage in aggressive tax avoidance. Phillips (2003) finds that compensating business unit managers based on after-tax performance measures leads to lower effective tax rates.
If there are few costs associated with avoiding taxes, then all firms should minimize corporate tax payments. However, corporate tax payments vary widely across industries and across firms in the same industry. The question of why so many firms forgo tax-avoidance opportunities has been called the ''under-sheltering puzzle'' (Weisbach 2002; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) . This phenomenon suggests that there must be non-trivial costs in avoiding taxes. Some examples include implementation cost, potential penalties imposed by the taxing authorities, and potential reputation damage to firms and their managers (e.g., S. Chen, X. Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin 2010; Rego and Wilson 2012; Graham et al. 2014) . For more aggressive tax avoidance, the uncertainty involved can be particularly high.
The most direct risk involved in aggressive tax avoidance is challenges from tax authorities and-for publicly traded firms, such as in our sample-auditors and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Because aggressive tax positions are normally supported by a relatively weak set of facts, they are more likely to be successfully challenged (Rego and Wilson 2012) . To the extent that tax aggressiveness is deemed by tax authorities to be noncompliance, it may be subject to large penalties (Lisowsky 2009 ). In his sample of tax-shelter firms, Wilson (2009) estimates that the penalty can be as high as 40 percent of the original tax savings from the taxshelter transactions.
Moreover, if a firm is suspected of being tax aggressive, then the firm may bear reputational costs. The popular press often casts a negative light on firms with aggressive tax positions. For instance, National Public Radio (NPR 2011) disclosed that firms such as Pfizer, Microsoft, and Google were taking advantage of offshore tax havens. These firms were accused of engaging in ''corporate tax dodging'' and not paying their fair share. Moreover, Mills et al. (2013) find that federal contractors that are highly sensitive to political costs have higher effective tax rates, consistent with aggressive tax avoidance imposing political costs on firms. More recently, Austin and Wilson (2013) argue that another reason firms refrain from aggressive tax avoidance is the concern of loss of reputation with customers. They find some evidence that firms with valuable reputation is an important consideration when choosing their tax strategies.
Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes
Gender differences in attitudes toward risk and in risk-related behavior have long been studied in the psychology and economics literatures. Most studies support the notion that women are more risk averse than men in the general population. 7 Croson and Gneezy (2009) summarize three possible explanations for the gender difference in risk-taking behaviors. First, women are more likely to experience intense nervousness and fear than men in an uncertain situation. Second, women are less confident than men, which may affect the perception of the probability distribution underlying a risk. Finally, women tend to view risky situations as threats rather than challenges, which also lead to increased risk aversion.
A large body of literature on gender differences in the general population addresses financial investment choices. For instance, Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find that single women have less risky assets in their investment portfolios than other groups. Using different survey data, Sundén and Surette (1998) and Bernasek and Shwiff (2001) draw a similar conclusion: women invest their pension assets more conservatively than men do. Moreover, women are more likely to be in compliance with rules and regulations. For example, Brinig (1995) finds that women are less willing to risk being caught and convicted of speeding than men.
Gender differences in risk attitudes among professionals are less well established. Some studies suggest that female executives make more conservative corporate decisions. For instance, Barua et al. (2010) find that firms with female CFOs have lower absolute discretionary accruals and lower absolute accrual estimation errors. Francis et al. (2014) find that female CFOs make more conservative financial reporting. Huang and Kisgen (2013) find that female executives are less likely to make significant acquisitions and issue debt. Olsen and Cox (2001) find that female professional investors are more concerned about downside risk than their male counterparts. Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2013) find that firms with female CFOs are associated with lower cost of debt. Furthermore, Sexton and Bowman-Upton (1990) find that female entrepreneurs are less willing to be involved in uncertain situations.
Other researchers argue that gender differences among professionals are smaller than in the general population and are often nonexistent. For instance, focusing on female CFOs' impact on financial reporting, Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011) find no evidence of CFO gender effect on discretionary accruals. Atkinson et al. (2003) compare the performance and investment behavior of male and female fixed-income mutual fund managers. They find that the ways in which men and women manage funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Using archival data and lab results, Dwyer et al. (2002) and Gysler, Brown-Kruse, and Schubert (2002) draw similar conclusions. Kumar (2010) argues that women with high risk tolerance and superior forecasting abilities tend to self-select into the professional manager profession. He finds that female analysts issue bolder and more accurate forecasts, and that stock market participants respond more strongly to the forecast revisions by female analysts. 6 A recent study by Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014) did not find evidence of reputational cost in 118 confirmed sheltering cases in terms of long-run stock performance, CEO and CFO turnover, or public media reputation, etc. The authors acknowledge that the small sample might lack power or that ''only firms that are immune to reputational concerns engage in tax shelters'' (Gallemore et al. 2014, 3) . Graham et al. (2014) also point out that the executives' reputation concerns are difficult to test using archival data. 7 Eckel and Grossman (2004) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide excellent surveys of gender differences in risk attitudes in the economics literature, and a summary of studies on gender differences in the psychology literature can be found in Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) .
To summarize, the literature has mixed views on gender differences in risk attitudes among professionals. Corporate CFOs have the responsibility of deciding and monitoring tax reporting and tax-related financial reporting, and they should be aware of the significant uncertainty involved in the aggressive tax strategies. If female CFOs indeed have higher degrees of risk aversion, then we expect that firms with female CFOs are more cautious with aggressive tax-avoidance activities. In contrast, if female CFOs self-select into the profession and have comparable risk attitudes as their male counterparts, then there should be no gender effect in tax aggressiveness. Our hypothesis, stated as the alternative, is as follows:
H: Female CFOs are less likely to be associated with tax aggressiveness compared to male CFOs.
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Sample Selection
To examine the gender effect on tax aggressiveness, our primary research design is to compare the degrees of tax aggressiveness between the pre-and post-transition periods for male-to-female CFO turnover firms. Similar to Francis et al. (2014) and Huang and Kisgen (2013) , we collect gender information from the ExecuComp database, which covers most of the S&P 1500 public companies. In cases where there is missing gender information in ExecuComp, we manually search the 10-K filing of the firms through the SEC Edgar database. If the company filing does not report the gender of the CFOs, then we further search the company's website and other business websites (such as Forbes.com, Yahoo.com, Google.com, and ZoomInfo.com) to identify the gender of the executives. We construct our CFO transition sample using the following filters: (1) both pre-and post-transition CFOs must be in office consecutively for at least three years excluding the transition year; (2) if a firm changes its CFOs more than once, then we only count the first change and drop the subsequent changes for that firm; (3) we exclude financial firms and utility companies (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 and 4999), and our time period is from 1988 to 2007. 8 The resulting sample is then merged with Compustat to obtain firm accounting information. 9 Our final sample consists of 974 firm-year observations with 92 cases of male-to-female transitions. For the other two types of transitions that we examine, we have 4,239 firm-year observations with 353 cases of male-tomale transitions, and 421 firm-year observations with 48 cases of female-to-male transitions.
Tax Aggressiveness Measures
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, 137) state that ''if tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies where something like municipal bond investments are at one end, then terms such as 'noncompliance,' 'evasion,' 'aggressiveness,' and 'sheltering' would be closer to the other end of the continuum.'' As our interest is in tax strategies that involve the most uncertainty, we focus on the aggressive end of the continuum. Following Frank et al. (2009) , Rego and Wilson (2012) , and Boone et al. (2013) , we use three measures to capture tax aggressiveness. Our first measure is the probability of tax sheltering based on Wilson (2009) . SHELTER is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if a firm's estimated sheltering probability is in the top quintile, and 0 otherwise. Our second measure is the predicted unrecognized tax benefits (PREDICTED UTB) calculated with the estimated coefficients from the prediction model in Rego and Wilson (2012) . Our third measure is the discretionary permanent book-tax differences (DTAX) introduced by Frank et al. (2009) .
Using actual sheltering cases, Wilson (2009) develops a model to predict the likelihood that a firm engages in tax-sheltering activities. Recent studies find that Wilson's (2009) sheltering probabilities have construct validity. For instance, researchers show that the sheltering probabilities are associated with the stock price crash risk (Kim, Li, and Zhang 2011) , the sensitivity of a manager's wealth to stock return volatility (Rego and Wilson 2012) , and irresponsible corporate social activities (Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2013) . Following Rego and Wilson (2012) and Hoi et al. (2013) , we capture the risky tax positions by focusing on firms with top quintile values of estimated sheltering probability.
Unrecognized tax benefits represent the amount of income taxes associated with uncertain tax positions. Recent studies find that the UTB level is positively associated with aggressive tax avoidance. For example, using confidential tax-shelter data from the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis, Lisowsky et al. (2013) find that the UTB level is highly and positively associated with tax-shelter activities. FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48, FASB 2006) was enacted in June 2006 and became effective for all publicly listed companies with the fiscal year beginning after December 15, 2006. It represents a drastic change in the disclosure of the tax reserve for uncertain tax positions. Prior to FIN 48, companies used varied methods to estimate UTB, which led to UTB disclosures that were not necessarily comparable across firms. 10 In addition, the lack of a clear standard also resulted in scant and opaque UTB disclosures prior to FIN 48 (Gleason and Mills 2002; Blouin, Gleason, Mills, and Sikes 2010) . Because our sample period ends in 2007, we do not have actual UTB information for our sample firms. Following Cazier et al. (2009) , Rego and Wilson (2012) , and Boone et al. (2013) , we estimate the predicted UTB level based on the estimated coefficients from the prediction model in Rego and Wilson (2012) .
As SHELTER and PREDICTED UTB are both linear combinations of a set of firm characteristics, it is possible that our results are attributable to changes in firm characteristics rather than changes in tax aggressiveness. To alleviate this concern, we use DTAX as the third measure of tax aggressiveness. DTAX was established by Frank et al. (2009) and has become increasingly used as a proxy for tax aggressiveness in the accounting literature (e.g., Rego and Wilson 2012; Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2014; Lisowsky et al. 2013 ). Frank et al. (2009) argue that book-tax differences have both a temporary and a permanent component. They find that it is the discretionary permanent component of book-tax differences-DTAX-that is significantly related to actual cases of tax sheltering. Appendix A provides detailed information about how we construct these three measures of tax aggressiveness.
Research Design and Summary Statistics
Following Chen et al. (2010) and Hoi et al. (2013) , we use the following multiple regression model to test our hypothesis:
where TAX_AGG i,t represents the three tax aggressiveness measures for firm i in year t. POST i,t 10 Methods used by firms prior to FIN 48 were offered in SFAS No. 109, Accounting for Income Taxes (FASB 1992), now ASC No. 740, and SFAS No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies (FASB 1975) , now ASC No. 450. According to the FIN 48 Summary, SFAS No. 109 ''contains no specific guidance on how to address uncertainty in accounting for income tax assets and liabilities. As a result, diverse accounting practices have developed resulting in inconsistency in the criteria used to recognize, derecognize, and measure benefits related to income taxes. The diversity in practice (regarding uncertain tax positions) has resulted in noncomparability in reporting income tax assets and liabilities.'' captures CFO gender effect on tax aggressiveness and is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm-year is after a (male-to-female) CFO transition, and 0 if a firm-year is before a CFO transition. More profitable firms could have higher incentives for tax planning (Chen et al. 2010 ), thus we control for ROA i,t . ROA i,t is the return on assets for firm i in year t measured as operating income (PI À XI) scaled by lagged assets (AT). More leveraged firms are less likely to engage in aggressive tax planning because of the tax benefits of debt financing (e.g., Graham and Tucker 2006) . We include LEVERAGE i,t in the regressions. LEVERAGE i,t is leverage for firm i in year t calculated as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by lagged assets (AT). We use NOL i,t and DNOL i,t to capture whether firms use the tax benefits associated with loss carry forwards. NOL i,t is a dummy variable coded as 1 if loss carry forward (TLCF) for firm i is positive as of the beginning of the year t, and 0 otherwise; DNOL i,t is the change in loss carry forward (TLCF) for firm i in year t scaled by lagged assets (AT). Capital-intensive firms are more affected by the different treatments of depreciation expenses for tax and financial reporting purposes, so we include PPE i,t , which is calculated as property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) for firm i in year t scaled by lagged assets (AT). We include EQINC i,t and INTANG i,t to control for the differential book and tax treatments of intangible assets and consolidated earnings accounted for using the equity method. INTANG i,t is the intangible assets (INTAN) for firm i in year t scaled by lagged assets (AT); EQINC i,t is the equity income in earnings for firm i in year t scaled by lagged assets (AT). We also control for firm size (SIZE i,t ) and growth opportunities (MB i,t ) because larger firms exhibit more tax avoidance due to economies of scale and firm complexity, and high growth firms have more investments that generate increased tax avoidance (e.g., Boone et al. 2013) . SIZE i,t is the natural logarithm of total assets (AT) for firm i at the beginning of year t; MB i,t is the market-to-book ratio measured as market value of equity scaled by the book value of equity for firm i at the beginning of year t. Next, we control for CFO-VEGA i,t because Rego and Wilson (2012) show that tax avoidance increases as CEOs' risk-taking incentives increase. CFO-VEGA i,t is the sensitivity of the change in the Black-Scholes option value for a 1 percent change in stock return volatility multiplied by the number of options in the CFO's portfolio for firm i in year t. Finally, we include dummy variables to control for year and industry fixed effects. Table 1 reports sample statistics of the male-to-female CFO transition sample. The sample size for the three tax aggressiveness measures varies due to data requirements in the estimation procedures. We find that the mean value of TAX SHELTERING PROBABILITY is 0.571, the mean value of PREDICTED UTB is 0.010, and the mean value of DTAX is 0.020. These values are similar to those reported in Kim et al. (2011) , Rego and Wilson (2012) , and Hasan et al. (2014) . Table 1 also shows that the average value of ROA is 0.052, the mean value of LEVERAGE is 0.223, the average PPE is 0.324, and the mean INTANG is 0.167. Approximately 25 percent of the observations have a NOL. The mean MB is 1.829, and the mean CFO-VEGA is 47.019. Table 2 presents Logit and OLS regression results on how the transitions from male CFOs to female CFOs affect tax aggressiveness.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Baseline Regression Results
In Table 2 , Column (1), we report the results of estimating Equation (1) using SHELTER as the dependent variable. The coefficient on POST is À0.875 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient of À0.875 translates into a marginal effect of À0.174 in the Logit regression, indicating that the probability of tax sheltering is 17.4 percent lower in the posttransition period (under the control of female CFOs) than in the pre-transition period (under the control of male CFOs). 11 Thus, the result is economically meaningful and it is consistent with our hypothesis and suggests that female CFOs are less likely to be involved in tax-shelter behaviors as compared to their male counterparts.
In Column (2), we report the results of estimating Equation (1) using PREDICTED UTB as the dependent variable. The coefficient on POST is À0.002 and is significant at the 5 percent level, indicating that the predicted UTB level in the post-transition period is 0.002 lower than that in the pre-transition period. Given that the mean value of PREDICTED UTB is 0.010, the result is economically meaningful and is comparable to other studies. 12 Again, the result is consistent with our hypothesis and shows that female CFOs are associated with a lower level of uncertain tax positions than their male counterparts. (2009); PREDICTED UTB ¼ predicted unrecognized tax benefits calculated with the estimated coefficients from the prediction model in Rego and Wilson (2012) ; year; ROA ¼ return on assets measured as operating income (PI À XI) scaled by lagged assets (AT); LEVERAGE ¼ leverage ratio measured as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by lagged assets (AT); NOL ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if loss carry forward (TLCF) is positive as of the beginning of the year, and 0 otherwise; DNOL ¼ change in loss carry forward (TLCF) scaled by lagged assets (AT); PPE ¼ property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) scaled by lagged assets (AT); INTANG ¼ intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by lagged assets (AT); EQINC ¼ equity income in earnings (ESUB) scaled by lagged assets (AT);
(continued on next page)
In Column (3), we report the results of estimating Equation (1) using DTAX as the third measure of tax aggressiveness. The coefficient on POST is À0.021 and is significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that, on average, the discretionary permanent book-tax differences are significantly lower for firms under the control of female CFOs than for firms under the control of male CFOs. The result is also consistent with our hypothesis and triangulates the findings from the other two measures of tax aggressiveness.
Sensitivity Tests
Difference-in-Differences Regression Results
Unobservable time series changes contemporaneous with CFO changes could also affect tax aggressiveness, which could make our results spurious. To remove the effect of contemporaneous changes on our results, we employ a difference-in-differences methodology. Following Francis et al. (2014) and Huang and Kisgen (2013) , we first construct a control sample of firms that change their CFOs from male to male. We then pool the treatment sample (i.e., firms that switch from male CFOs to female CFOs) and the control sample. 13 We create a dummy variable FEMALE that equals 1 if a firm is a male-to-female CFO transition firm, and 0 if a firm is a male-to-male CFO transition firm. We add an interaction term POST Ã FEMALE into the Equation (1) using the pooled sample. Again POST is coded as 1 if a year is after a CFO transition, and 0 if a year is before a CFO transition. If female CFOs are less tax aggressive than male CFOs, then we expect the coefficient on the interaction variable to be significantly negative.
Results from these regressions are reported in Table 3 . Column (1) of Table 3 reports estimation results when we use SHELTER as the dependent variable. The coefficient on POST is 0.448 and is significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that the tax-sheltering probability increases after male-to-male CFO changes. Furthermore, the interaction term POST Ã FEMALE has a coefficient of À1.371 and is significant at the 1 percent level. This result indicates that after maleto-female CFO changes, the tax-sheltering probability decreases. The evidence is consistent with female CFOs being associated with lower probability of tax sheltering than their male counterparts, providing further support to the baseline regression results.
In Column (2), we use PREDICTED UTB as the dependent variable. We find that the coefficient on POST is statistically insignificant. Again, the interaction term POST Ã FEMALE has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting that firms in the post maleto-female CFO transition period are associated with lower uncertainty tax positions as compared to firms in the post male-to-male transition period. In Column (3), we draw similar inferences when we use DTAX as the measure of tax aggressiveness. Specifically, the coefficient on POST is insignificant, but the coefficient on the interaction term POST Ã FEMALE is negative and statistically significant. SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year; MB ¼ market-to-book ratio; and CFO-VEGA ¼ sensitivity of the change in the Black-Scholes option value for a 1 percent change in stock return volatility, multiplied by the number of options in the CFO's portfolio. 13 We compared major firm characteristics between the control and treatment firms. We do not find significant differences between the two samples except for the market-to-book ratio (i.e., firms switching to female CFOs have a slightly higher market-to-book ratio than firms switching to male CFOs). For brevity, we do not tabulate the results. year; FEMALE ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is a male-to-female transition firm, and 0 if a firm is a male-to-male transition firm; ROA ¼ return on assets measured as operating income (PI À XI) scaled by lagged assets (AT); LEVERAGE ¼ leverage ratio measured as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by lagged assets (AT);
In sum, the findings of the difference-in-differences approach suggest that the decreases in tax aggressiveness following the male-to-female transitions are less likely to be attributed to unobservable contemporaneous time-series changes. They provide further support for our hypothesis that female CFOs are less likely to be associated with tax aggressiveness.
Propensity Score Matching Results
Another concern is self-selection bias. It could be the case that female CFOs are not randomly assigned to firms. To address this potential selection bias issue, we apply a propensity score matching approach. We first construct the treatment sample using variables in the ExecuComp database. We collect all firm-year level CFO information and then create a dummy variable FEMALE CFO that equals 1 if a CFO is female, and 0 otherwise. Then we match this treatment female CFO sample with the male CFO sample. The matching begins with a Logit regression of the FEMALE CFO dummy variable on the major firm characteristics, board characteristics, and CFO personal characteristics. Specifically, the independent variables include ROA, LEVERAGE, NOL, SIZE, MB, CFO AGE, CFO SHAREHOLDING (the percentage of common shares holdings by CFOs), INSIDER (a dummy variable that equals 1 if a CFO is hired from inside the firm, and 0 otherwise), BOARD SIZE (total number of board members), BOARD INDEPENDENCE (the ratio of number of outside directors to board size), and BOARD DUALITY (a dummy variable that equals 1 if a CEO is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise).
In Panel A of Table 4 , we report the results on the determinants of female CFOs. We find that firms with a higher market-to-book ratio and larger boards are more likely to choose female CFOs, and that female CFOs are more likely to be promoted from within the firm than hired from outside. Furthermore, firms with dual boards are less likely to choose a female CFO, and the average female CFO is younger than her male counterparts.
Next, we use the propensity scores obtained from the Logit estimations and perform a one-toone nearest neighbor match. To ensure that the treatment sample and the matching sample are not significantly different in terms of major firm characteristics, we use the caliper-matching method and match within a caliper of 10 percent, where caliper refers to the difference in the predicted probabilities between the treatment and matching firms. This procedure ensures that each male-tofemale CFO transition firm is paired with a male-to-male CFO transition firm with similar firm characteristics. After matching, our final sample includes 296 treatment sample observations and 296 control sample observations. Panel B of Table 4 provides summary statistics of variables that are used in the matching process for both treatment and control samples, as well as the differences in mean and t-test results. Because we use the caliper-matching method, our matched control sample does not systematically differ from our treatment sample.
TABLE 3 (continued)
NOL ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if loss carry forward (TLCF) is positive as of the beginning of the year, and 0 otherwise; DNOL ¼ change in loss carry forward (TLCF) scaled by lagged assets (AT); PPE ¼ property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) scaled by lagged assets (AT); INTANG ¼ intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by lagged assets (AT); EQINC ¼ equity income in earnings (ESUB) scaled by lagged assets (AT); SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year; MB ¼ market-to-book ratio; and CFO-VEGA ¼ sensitivity of the change in the Black-Scholes option value for a 1 percent change in stock return volatility, multiplied by the number of options in the CFO's portfolio. Year and industry dummies are included in each specification.
Variable Definitions:
SHELTER ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm's estimated tax sheltering probability is in the top quintile of tax sheltering probabilities, and 0 otherwise; TAX SHELTERING PROBABILITY ¼ calculated based on Wilson (2009); PREDICTED UTB ¼ predicted unrecognized tax benefits calculated with the estimated coefficients from the prediction model in Rego and Wilson (2012) ; DTAX ¼ discretionary permanent book-tax difference in Frank et al. (2009) ; FEMALE CFO ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if a CFO is a female, and 0 otherwise; ROA ¼ return on assets measured as operating income (PI À XI) scaled by lagged assets (AT); LEVERAGE ¼ leverage ratio measured as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by lagged assets (AT); NOL ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if loss carry forward (TLCF) is positive as of the beginning of the year, and 0 otherwise; DNOL ¼ change in loss carry forward (TLCF) scaled by lagged assets (AT); PPE ¼ property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) scaled by lagged assets (AT); INTANG ¼ intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by lagged assets (AT);
(continued on next page) Panel C of Table 4 reports the results from propensity score matching regression. As before, we use SHELTER, PREDICTED UTB, and DTAX as the measures of tax aggressiveness in Columns (1), (2), and (3), respectively. We find that the three coefficients on FEMALE CFO are all negative and statistically significant, indicating that female CFOs are less tax aggressive than male CFOs in the matched sample. Thus, the results using the propensity score matching approach mitigate the concern with self-selection bias and further support our hypothesis.
Female-to-Male CFO Transitions and Tax Aggressiveness
To the extent that the significant decrease in the level of tax aggressiveness following a maleto-female CFO transition is due to the different risk preferences of female and male CFOs, we would expect the degree of tax aggressiveness to increase after firms change from female CFOs to male CFOs. To examine if this is the case, we construct a sample of female-to-male CFO transitions using the same criteria as the male-to-female CFO transitions sample. Our final sample includes 48 female-to-male CFO changes. Table 5 presents regression results using the female-to-male CFO transitions sample. In the regression, POST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a year is after the female-to-male CFO transition year, and 0 if a year is before the transition year. We find that all three coefficients on POST are positive and that two out of three are significant at the 10 percent level. In general, our results suggest that firms become more tax aggressive after a female-to-male CFO transition. The additional evidence is consistent with our hypothesis and it triangulates our findings from the maleto-female transitions sample.
Other Sensitivity Tests
We further conduct several sensitivity tests. To mitigate the effects of unobservable within-firm factors on tax aggressiveness, we conduct Logit and OLS regressions with standard errors adjusted for within-firm clustering. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 6 . For brevity, we only report results for our main testing variable POST. We find that POST is still statistically significant after adjusting standard errors for within-firm clustering. This is true whether we measure tax aggressiveness using SHELTER, PREDICTED UTB, or DTAX.
The CFO gender effects on tax aggressiveness could be different for CFOs with different tenures. In our sample, CFO tenure ranges from three to 11 years. For a more sensible comparison, we create a subsample by keeping the time period between year tÀ3 and year tþ3. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 6 . With this alternative sample, the three coefficients on POST are still negative and statistically significant, providing support to the results in our baseline regressions.
We control for several additional variables to see whether our results are sensitive to additional controls. The additional controls include CFO AGE, PREVIOUS CFO (a dummy variable that equals 1 if a CFO has previous CFO experience, and 0 otherwise), CFO SHAREHOLDING, (2009); PREDICTED UTB ¼ predicted unrecognized tax benefits calculated with the estimated coefficients from the prediction model in Rego and Wilson (2012) ; DTAX ¼ discretionary permanent book-tax difference in Frank et al. (2009) ; POST ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if a year is after CFO transition year, and 0 if a year is before CFO transition
year; ROA ¼ return on assets measured as operating income (PI À XI) scaled by lagged assets (AT); LEVERAGE ¼ leverage ratio measured as long-term debt (DLTT) scaled by lagged assets (AT); NOL ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if loss carry forward (TLCF) is positive as of the beginning of the year, and 0 otherwise; DNOL ¼ change in loss carry forward (TLCF) scaled by lagged assets (AT); PPE ¼ property, plant, and equipment (PPENT) scaled by lagged assets (AT); INTANG ¼ intangible assets (INTAN) scaled by lagged assets (AT); EQINC ¼ equity income in earnings (ESUB) scaled by lagged assets (AT); SIZE ¼ natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of the year;
(continued on next page) INSIDER, FOREIGN INCOME (foreign income scaled by lagged assets), G-INDEX (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [2003] corporate governance index), and CONCURRENT CEO CHANGE (a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is also a CEO change during the CFO transition year, and 0 otherwise). The results are reported in Panel C of Table 6 . We find that our main results continue to hold after controlling for these CFO personal characteristics and corporate governance attributes.
The Risk Effect on the Relation between Female CFOs and Tax Aggressiveness
So far our results provide evidence that female CFOs are less likely to be associated with tax aggressiveness than male CFOs. If female CFOs' risk aversion is the underlying reason, then we should observe even more conservative tax strategies when female CFOs are subject to higher job risk. Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) and Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2008) find that managerial turnover rate is higher following the revelation of aggressive accounting. In addition, they find that displaced managers are less likely to find comparable employment subsequent to the displacement. Thus, if female CFOs are concerned about maintaining their positions at the top managerial level, then they could be particularly conservative in their tax positions.
To test this conjecture, we construct a job risk measure. Using ExecuComp information, we first calculate the turnover rate of each firm. It is defined as the total number of top managers being fired in the industry scaled by the total number of firms in the industry. We then construct a dummy variable JOB RISK that equals 1 if a firm's turnover rate is above the median value of the turnover rate, and 0 otherwise. We bisect the full sample into HIGH JOB RISK firms and LOW JOB RISK firms. We rerun Equation (1) with the two subsamples and report the results in Table 7 . We find that the coefficients on POST are only significant for firms with high job risk, not for firms with low job risk. This is true regardless of which of the three measures of tax aggressiveness are used as the dependent variable. Overall, the findings indicate that female CFOs are less tax aggressive than males only when they have bigger concerns with their job security. The results are consistent with risk aversion being a channel through which CFO gender affects tax aggressiveness.
Are Results Driven by Overconfidence of Male CFOs?
In this paper, we argue that female CFOs are less associated with tax aggressiveness than male CFOs as a result of risk aversion. Some recent studies argue that the overconfidence of male executives could also drive their aggressive corporate decisions (e.g., Huang and Kisgen 2013) . Although both overconfidence of males and risk aversion of females predict less tax aggressiveness for female CFOs, the implications of these two stories are different. If our results are due to female CFOs' lower degree of overconfidence, then one could view lower levels of tax aggressiveness by female CFOs as helping firms engage in appropriate tax planning. If, on the other hand, the results are due to female CFOs' higher degree of risk aversion, one could argue that female CFOs do not pursue all available tax-saving opportunities for firms.
To test whether our results are driven by overconfidence of male CFOs or risk aversion of female CFOs, we conduct two sets of tests. First, we include the overconfidence dummy and the interaction between the overconfidence dummy and POST as additional controls in Equation (1). The coefficient on POST would capture how male-to-female CFO changes affect tax aggressiveness within the subsample of CFOs who are not overconfident, and the coefficient on the interaction term captures the incremental effect of overconfident male-to-female CFO changes on tax aggressiveness. Following Ahmed and Duellman (2013) , we use three proxies to measure overconfidence. HOLDER67 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ratio of stock options in-the-money exceeds 0.67 at least twice during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. OVER-INVEST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the residual from a regression of total assets growth on sales growth run by industryyear is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise. OVER-CAPX is a dummy variable that equals 1 if capital expenditures deflated by lagged total assets is greater than the median in the firm's Fama-French industry, and 0 otherwise.
Second, if firms miss valuable tax-saving opportunities due to the risk aversion of female CFOs, then good corporate governance should mitigate lower degrees of tax aggressiveness under *, **, *** Significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(continued on next page) female CFOs. We use two measures of good governance. The first one is LOW G-INDEX, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm's G-index is below the median value of G-index for the sample, and 0 otherwise. Using institutional ownership to measure good governance, Desai and Dharmapala (2009) find that tax aggressiveness increases firm value when firms have good corporate governance. Following their study, we use HIGH INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP as our second measure of good governance. It is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm's institutional ownership is above the median value of the institutional ownership for the sample, and 0 otherwise. We interact POST with the two good governance metrics, separately. We expect the interaction terms to have positive coefficients if risk aversion of female CFOs is the main underlying story. In Panel A of Table 8 , we report the results when we add the three overconfidence indicator variables and their interactions with POST in Equation (1). Our results show that POST carries negative signs in all nine regressions and is negative and statistically significant in seven of them. This suggests that in the subsample of CFOs who are not overconfident, a male-to-female transition is still associated with a reduced level of tax aggressiveness. In addition, eight out of nine coefficients on the interaction terms are insignificant, indicating that the gender effect in tax aggressiveness is not significantly different between overconfident CFOs and CFOs who are not overconfident. Overall, the evidence suggests that overconfidence is unlikely to solely explain our results. Female CFOs' higher degree of risk aversion is at least one important underlying reason for our findings.
In Panel B of Table 8 , we report the results when we add the two variables that proxy for good governance and their interactions with POST. When SHELTER is the dependent variable (Models (1) and (2)), POST continues to be negative and statistically significant. The interaction of LOW G-INDEX and POST is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. There is some evidence that the female CFOs' conservatism in tax planning is diminished for firms with good corporate governance. In Models (3) and (4), PREDICTED UTB is the dependent variable. Again, POST remains negative and significant. The interaction of HIGH INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP and POST is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. Once more, the evidence is consistent with good corporate governance mitigating the gender effect on tax aggressiveness. In Models (5) and (6), when we use DTAX as the measure of tax aggressiveness, the interaction of HIGH INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP and POST is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, triangulating the earlier results. Taken together, the test results reported in Table 8 , Panel B provide evidence that female CFOs from good-governance firms are associated with less conservative tax strategies than female CFOs from poor-governance firms. Together with evidence in Panel A, the results are consistent with the risk aversion of female CFOs being one important underlying reason for our findings.
Female CFOs and Broad Tax Avoidance
We have thus far provided evidence to support our hypothesis that female CFOs are less tax aggressive than their male counterparts. As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out, tax avoidance is a continuum of tax planning activities that ranges from perfectly legal transactions at one end to aggressive tax-avoidance practices at the other end. In the main text, we focus on tax aggressiveness, i.e., the subset of tax-avoidance activities that involve the most uncertainties, because it provides a relatively strong setting to detect gender effect. Managers could also avoid tax by using tax planning strategies that entail less risk. In this section, we examine whether female CFOs are also less associated with broad tax avoidance compared to male CFOs. Lisowsky et al. (2013) place effective tax rate (ETR), cash effective tax rate (CETR), and total book-tax difference (BT) toward the mostly legal and less uncertain end of the tax avoidance continuum. Rego and Wilson (2012) also argue that CETR diverges farther from the construct of PREDICTED UTB ¼ predicted unrecognized tax benefits calculated with the estimated coefficients from the prediction model in Rego and Wilson (2012) ;
DTAX ¼ discretionary permanent book-tax difference in Frank et al. (2009) ; POST ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if a year is after CFO transition year, and 0 if a year is before CFO transition year; HOLDER67 ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ratio of the options in-the-money exceeds 0.67 at least twice during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. The ratio of the options in-the-money is calculated based on Ahmed and Duellman (2013); OVER-INVEST ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if the residual of a regression of total assets growth on sales growth run by industry-year is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise;
OVER-CAPX ¼ a dummy variable that equals 1 if the capital expenditures deflated by lagged total assets are greater than the median level of capital expenditures to lagged total assets of the firm's Fama-French industry, and 0 otherwise;
(continued on next page) aggressive tax avoidance than SHELTER, PREDICTED UTB, and DTAX-the three tax aggressive metrics in our main test. As a result, we capture broad tax avoidance with ETR, CETR, and BT, and rerun Equation (1). ETR is the ratio of total tax expenses over pretax income. CETR is the ratio of cash tax paid over pretax income. BT is the Manzon and Plesko (2002) measure of total book-tax differences.
We report the results in Table 9 . The coefficients on POST are statistically insignificant in all three models. We, thus, find no evidence that female CFOs behave differently compared to their male counterparts in terms of broad tax-avoidance strategies. This is consistent with inferences from Dyreng et al. (2010) , who also document no gender effect when measuring tax avoidance with ETR and CETR. According to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and Lisowsky et al. (2013) , ETR and CETR reflect the entire spectrum of a firm's tax-avoidance activities, which includes tax aggressive strategies. Because ETR and CETR do not solely reflect tax aggressiveness, it is not surprising that we find no differences between male and female CFOs in terms of broad tax avoidance.
CONCLUSION
Tax aggressiveness has become an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in corporate America and has attracted considerable attention from regulators, the financial press, and investors. Extant studies identify a wide range of determinants of tax aggressiveness such as various firm attributes, compensation incentives, and manager fixed effects (e.g., Gupta and Newberry 1997; Phillips 2003; Wilson 2009; Dyreng et al. 2010; Rego and Wilson 2012; Lisowsky et al. 2013) . In this paper, we borrow from the psychology and economics literature and link the risk aversion of female CFOs to firms' varying degrees of tax aggressiveness. We employ a methodology that allows us to isolate the gender effect on tax aggressiveness. Specifically, we construct a sample with male-to-female CFO transitions and then examine whether there is a significant decline in tax aggressiveness following the male-to-female CFO transitions. Our findings are threefold. First, female CFOs are less likely to be associated with tax aggressiveness compared to their male counterparts. Second, risk aversion of female CFOs is an important factor-if not the sole reason-behind the gender differences in tax aggressiveness. Finally, we find no evidence that sample female CFOs behave differently from their male counterparts in less-risky tax-avoidance activities.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first study to document executive gender effect on tax aggressiveness. Our study suggests that although female CFOs do not act differently compared to their male counterparts in terms of broad tax avoidance, they pursue aggressive tax strategies to a lesser extent. Our study provides insight into the role that risk preferences of top executives play in the development of a firm's tax strategy. Furthermore, our study answers Hanlon and Heitzman's (2010) call for more research on the influence of managers' individual characteristics on corporate tax decisions.
Our results should be interpreted in light of other studies on the gender effect. In the current literature, female executives appear to serve companies well in several aspects of corporate strategies. For instance, prior studies find that female executives engage less in value-decreasing acquisitions, employ lower levels of debt, and promote better-quality financial reporting (e.g., Barua et al. 2010; Francis et al. 2014; Huang and Kisgen 2013) . We complement this line of research by identifying an aspect of decision making by female CFOs that could be costly to firms. Specifically, female CFOs do not pursue all tax-saving opportunities, probably to avoid additional risk. With more and more companies having females in their top management team, it is increasingly important to fully understand potential benefits and costs of having female CFOs. 14 
